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ment and not on the rights of the parties within the framework of the
system, was the result.
To say that the Glidden decision was a matter of contract interpreta-
tion is not to minimize its significance or its potential effect in the field
of labor relations. The case has already been cited in a similar plant re-
moval case 3 and would seem to have social and economic ramifications
far beyond the issue of the survival of seniority rights.64
It is suggested, however, that the most important consequence of the
Glidden decision will be to force the issue of plant removal and its effect
upon the rights of the parties under the agreement back into the frame-
work of the collective bargaining system. The employer desirous of
avoiding the result of the Glidden case will be required to raise the issue
of plant removal during contract negotiations in the attempt to incor-
porate a satisfactory resolution of the problem into the written agreement.
Ironically, however, the mere raising of the issue may be tantamount to
incorporating the result of the Glidden case into the agreement, because
(and this is the significant aspect of the Glidden decision) the employer
will be required to raise the issue at a time when the union is in a position
to employ its economic weapons in support of its demands, i.e., during
contract negotiations as opposed to immediately preceding the move. Un-
like the situation as it existed in Glidden, the effect of plant removal up-
on employee tenure will not be dependent upon the good faith of the em-
ployer, but upon the bargaining power of the union. In that the Glidden
decision places the burden on the employer not only to raise the issue of
plant removal, but also to resolve it, the bargaining advantage would
seem to be with the union. Seen in this light, Glidden appears to be an
important tactical victory for organized labor.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE INDIANA SUNDAY
CLOSING LAW
Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court' indicate that
63. Oddie v. Ross Gear & Tool Co., 195 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Mich. 1961). De-
fendant Ross Gear and Tool Co. announced to its employees its intention of closing
down operations at its Michigan division and moving to Tennessee, and of its plans to
terminate employment one month prior to the expiration date of the collective bargaining
agreement. A group of employees thereupon brought an action for declaratory relief
in the Federal District Court. The court relying solely on Glidden held that the em-
ployees were entitled to employment at the Tennessee plant by virtue of their seniority
rights.
64. Wall Street Journal, July 21, 1961, p. 1, col. 6.
1. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys From Harrison-
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Sunday Closing legislation has withstood the test of constitutionality
equally as well as it has withstood the ravages of time.2 The Court ruled
that the Sunday Blue Laws of Maryland, Massachusetts, and Pennsyl-
vania were not repugnant to the first or fourteenth amendments of the
United States Constitution. Although a number of cases involving this
type of legislation had reached the Court in the previous three quarters
of a century,3 this marked the first time that the problem had received
deliberate reflection against the background of the complexities of mod-
ern society.
Similar to the 1954 decisions on civil rights,4 the Supreme Court
holdings have acted as a catalyst to a chain reaction of controversy in
many cities and states. The reverberations have been particularly severe
in Indiana. There have been wholesale arrests for violating the Indiana
statute as well as the issuing of temporary injunctions against law en-
forcement agencies on constitutional grounds.5  As a result of such con-
fusion in interpretation and enforcement, it becomes significant to review
the treatment accorded this area of law in the courts of this state in order
to determine the effect of the United States Supreme Court decisions on
the general Sunday Closing Law in Indiana. It should be noted that the
recent Court decisions support only the proposition that Sunday Closing
Laws are not per se violative of the Constitution. The statute of each
state and its application in individual instances may yet be subject to at-
tack on constitutional grounds. Moreover, even though the statute is
valid under the Federal Constitution, the state court is not precluded from
examining it under the State Constitution.
SUNDAY CLOSING LAWS: THE BACKGROUND AND THE
SUPREME COURT DECISION
The question of Sunday laws and their enforcement has occupied a
significant place in the laws of western governments since 321 A.D.
when the initial Sunday law, issued by Constantine, proscribed all labor
on the venerable day of the sun.' The first important English legislation
on the subject was the statute of Henry VI in 1448 forbidding the show-
-Allentown v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961) ; Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961);
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
2. The Fourth Commandment, Exodus 31:14, is the spiritual basis for all Sunday
closing laws.
3. Kidd v. Ohio, 358 U.S. 132 (1958); Ullner v. Ohio, 358 U.S. 131 (1958); Gro-
chowiak v. Pennsylvania, 358 U.S. 47 (1958) ; Gundaker Central Motors v. Gassert, 354
U.$. 933 (1956); McGee v. North Carolina, 346 U.S. 802 (1953); Freidman v. New
York, 341 U.S. 907 (1950); Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U.S. 164 (1899); Hennington v.
Georgia, 163 U.S. 299 (1895); Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 (1884).
4. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. Indianapolis Star, Sept. 30, 1961, p. 1, col. 1.
6. Code Justin. 3.7.1.3.
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ing of goods and merchandise at all fairs and markets on Sundays and
holidays.7  In 1677 the English enacted a general statute requiring the
cessation of all business or labor of a person's ordinary calling on the
Lord's Day; however, works of charity and necessity were exempted
from this proscription.' This statute remains the basic law of England;
and at the time of the American Revolutionary War, it was the law en-
forced in all of the American colonies.9
At the present time, forty-nine states prohibit some sort of conduct
on Sunday which is legally performable on other days of the week."°
Thirty-one of the forty-nine states provide for a general prohibition of
one's usual activity with exceptions for works of charity and necessity."
Historically, these statutes set aside Sunday as the day of rest to
insure religious observance of the Sabbath. Early cases admit that this
was their purpose.12 It appears, because of the wording of the statutes 3
and the fact that often closing is required only during normal hours of
church attendance, 4 that these religious overtones have carried forward
to the present day. Nevertheless, with surprising unanimity, state courts
have upheld the Blue Laws against claims that they violate the religious
guaranties of the state constitutions. In only one case has such a law
been invalidated on religious grounds, 6 and that decision was shortlived.Y
Attacks on state Sunday Closing Laws based on the religious guaran-
tees of the first amendment have only recently become available. Only
since the end of World War I has the United States Supreme Court in-
dicated that the provisions of the first amendment of the Federal Con-
stitution are applicable to the state through the fourteenth amendment.'
It was not until 1940 that the religious provisions of the first amendment
were specifically declared to be applicable to the states. 9 Since Indiana
7. 27 Hen. 6, ch. 5 (1448).
8. 29 Char. 2, ch. 7 (1677).
9. Johnson, Sunday Legislation, 23 Ky. L.J. 131, 136 (1934).
10. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 553-59 (1961) (concurring opinion)
(app.).
11. Ibid.
12. See Shover v. State, 10 Ark. 259 (1850); Judefind v. State, 78 Md. 510, 28
Ati. 405 (1894) ; Commonwealth v. White, 190 Mass. 578, 77 N.E. 636 (1906).
13. Such religious terms as "Lord's Day," "Sabbath Day," "Christian Sabbath,"
"worldly employment," "Sabbath breaking," "secular business," "violate the Sabbath,"
and other similar expressions are prevalent in Sunday statutes. See, e.g., N.D. REV. CODE
§ 12-2115 (1943).
14. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 134, § 35 (1944) ; MISS. COD ANN. § 3957
(1942).
15. See Note, 59 COLUm. L. REv. 1192 (1959).
16. Ex parte Newman, 18 Cal. 502 (1858).
17. Ex parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 679 (1861).
18. E.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697 (1931) ; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
19. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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and nearly every other state has a Sunday Closing Law which may be
subjected to these criteria, a brief summary of the analysis used by the
United States Supreme Court in deciding that the Maryland, Massachu-
setts, and Pennsylvania statutes were constitutional will be helpful before
turning to the Indiana law.
The main argument advanced in the McGowan v. Maryland2 ' Two-
Guys From Harrison-Allentown v. McGinley,21 Braunfield v. Brown,22
and Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Supermarket- cases was that the respec-
tive state statutes24 were laws promoting an establishment of religion,
thereby violating the first amendment.2' The contention was that since
Sunday is the Sabbath Day of the Christian sects which are predominant
in our society, the prohibition against labor on that day is for the purpose
of facilitating church attendance, aiding the conduct of church services
and religious observance and inducing people with no religion or minimal
religious beliefs to join these Christian sects.
The majority, in sustaining the validity of the statutes, conceded that
the original Sunday Closing Laws were motivated by religious forces
but found the issue to be whether the present legislation retained this
religious character. Pointing out that the totally religious flavor of the
laws was diluted as early as the eighteenth century, and in recent years
even more powerful secular justifications could be marshalled for this
legislation, the Court interpreted the Blue Laws not as religious laws, but
rather as statutes imposing a day of leisure upon society. As such they
are a valid exercise of the state's police power. The Court states:
The present purpose and effect of most of them (Sunday
Laws) is to provide a uniform day of rest for all citizens; the
fact that this day is Sunday, a day of particular significance for
20. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
21. 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
22. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
23. 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
24. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 453 (1961) (app.) ; Braunfield v. Brown,
366 U.S. 599, 600 n1 (1961) ; Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617,
631 (1961) (app.).
25. It was also unsuccessfully contended that these Sunday Closing Laws violated
the constitutional guaranties of equal protection, due process (vagueness) and free ex-
ercise, of religion. The Court's disposition of these issue is not relevant to a treatment
of the Indiana Sunday Closing Law because they were based on the peculiarities of the
state statutes before the court. The equal protection argument was grounded on the
provisions of the Sunday Closing Law which permitted the sale of certain items and
forbade the sale of other items. This would never be an issue in Indiana because the
Indiana statute prohibits all sales on Sunday. The due process issue was unique unto
the Maryland statute which exempted merchandise incidental to the operation of bathing
beaches and amusement parks. Likewise, the Indiana statute could never be contended
to abridge the free exercise of religion clause of the first amendment because of the
Sabbatarian exception.
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the dominant Christian sects, does not bar the State from
achieving its secular goals. To say that the states can not pre-
scribe Sunday as a day of rest for these purposes (public health,
welfare, and recreation) solely because centuries ago such laws
had their genesis in religion would give a constitutional inter-
pretation of hostility to the public welfare rather than one of
mere separation of church and state.2"
Everson v. Board of Education27 was considered by the Court to
have promulgated the constitutional standards to be applied when it is
contended that a statute violates the prohibition of the first amendment
forbidding an establishment of religion. Since the Sunday Closing Laws
before the Court were found to be based on secular rather than religious
considerations, they were not in conflict with these constitutional stand-
ards because "it is equally true that the 'Establishment' caluse does not
ban federal or state regulation of conduct whose reason or effect merely
happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all re-
ligions."28
Mr. Justice Douglas dissented in all four cases because of what he
considered to be an irreconcilable conflict between the Sunday Closing
Laws and the 'Establishment' clause. He thought that the purpose, ef-
fect and practical operation of this type of legislation is based upon the
religious beliefs of the Christian majority, and it brings the sanction of
law to bear behind the practices of that religious group. Thus, "the State
undertakes to aid or prefer one religion over another-contrary to the
command of the Constitution."2
Therefore, it seems that the validity of Sunday Closing Laws, al-
leged to be in conflict with the establishment of religion clause of the
First Amendment, depends upon whether the statute can be categorized
as imposing a day of rest upon the state's citizens rather than promoting
the practices of a religious group. If the former is the case, the statute
is a constitutionally valid exercise of the state's police power.
It was also argued in the Braunfield3 ° case that the state should be
26. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 445 (1961).
27. 330 U.S. 1, 5 (1947).
"The establishment of religion clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go or to remain
away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief
in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing re-
ligious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance."
28. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961).
29. Id. at 577.
30. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
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required, because of the guarantee of free exercise of religion of the first
amendment, to exempt from its Sunday labor proscription those persons
who, because of religious convictions, observe a day of rest other than
Sunday. The Court considered the inclusion of such an exception a
wiser approach to the Sunday Closing Laws because without the excep-
tion the orthodox Jew must close his business on Saturday according to
the dictates of his religion and on Sunday according to the dictates of
the State, thereby losing business two days a week. This lack of legisla-
tive wisdom, however, was not considered to violate the guarantee of
free exercise of religion because the purpose of the Sunday Closing Laws
is to advance a legitimate secular goal of the State (a uniform day of
rest) rather than impede the observance of any religion, and there is no
other equally effective means of attaining this secular goal. The alterna-
tive method advanced by the petitioner was rejected because it might mul-
tiply enforcement problems, provide Sabbatarians with an economic ad-
vantage on Sunday and promote religious discrimination in hiring, since
Sabbatarians could only employ other Sabbatarians on Sunday.
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE INDIANA LAW
Indiana's Sunday Closing Law had its antecedent in An Act for the
Prevention of Vice and Immorality approved in 1807 by William Henry
Harrison, Governor of the Indiana Territory.31 In 1817, the Indiana
legislature passed An Act to Prevent Certain Immoral Practices which
has been retained in essentially its original form. 2 The present Indiana
law reads:
Whoever, being over fourteen years of age, is found on
the first day of the week, commonly called Sunday, rioting,
hunting, quarreling, at common labor, or engaged in his usual
vocation, works of charity and necessity only excepted, shall be
fined not less than one dollar nor more than ten dollars; but
nothing herein contained shall be construed to effect such as
conscientiously observe the seventh day of the week as the Sab-
bath, travelers and those engaged in conveying them, families re-
moving, keepers of toll bridges and toll gates, ferrymen acting
as such and persons in the publication and distribution of news,
or persons engaged in the playing the game of baseball or ice
hockey after one o'clock P.M. and not less than one thousand
[1000] feet distant from any established house of worship or
permanent church structure used for religious services or any
31. Laws of Indiana Territory, ch. XXXVII (1807).
32. Ind. Laws, 2nd Reg. Session, cb. LVII § 1 (1817).
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public hospital or private hospital erected prior to the passage of
the act. 3
Other Indiana statutes prohibit specific types of conduct on Sunday
such as playing football or other games where a fee is charged,3 hunt-
ing," selling alcoholic beverages," and dealing in new or used motor
vehicles."
The first Indiana cases dealing with the state Sunday Closing Law
were concerned with the breadth of application of the statute rather than
any possible conflict between it and the religious guaranties of the Indi-
ana Constitution. 8 The statute was construed to include every type of
secular business,3 9 however, and it thus became necessary for defendants
charged with violating the statute to shift their arguments from a con-
tention that the statute did not include their particular activities to an
attack on its constitutionaliy.
In 1857 the first such attack was made." It is difficult to determine
from the Court's opinion what constitutional provision the defendant
contended the law violated. It may be assumed, however, that the Indi-
ana prohibition against giving preference to any creed was relied upon.
Even more puzzling was the holding of the Court. It refused to discuss
and summarily asserted the constitutionality of the Sunday Closing Law
on the ground that it had been thoroughly examined and sustained by the
Indiana courts in earlier decisions. The only authority cited was one
Indiana case which dealt solely with whether a particular activity fell
within the statute"' and one Pennsylvania case which was concerned only
with whether a particular activity was a work of charity or necessity
within the meaning of that state's statute.42
The only other case in which the constitutionality of the general Sun-
day Closing Law was directly drawn into issue was Foltz v. State3 in
which the Court, relying on Voglesong v. State,4" again refused to discuss
the matter on the ground that it could not be considered an open question
in this state.
33. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4301 (Burns 1956).
34. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4302 (Burns 1956).
35. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4303 (Burns 1956).
36. IND. ANN. STAT. § 12-436 (Burns 1956); IND. ANN. STAT. § 63-205 (Burns
1956).
37. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4305 (Supp. Burns 1961).
38. Ind. Const art. I, § 2; Ind. Const. art. I, § 3; Ind. Gonst. art I, § 4.
39. See Link v. Clenmons, 7 Blackf. 479 (Ind. 1845) ; Reynolds v. Stevenson, 4
Ind. 619 (1853).
40. Vogelsong v. State, 9 Ind. 112 (1857).
41. Reynolds v. Stevenson, 4 Ind. 619 (1853).
42. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 22 Pa. 102 (1853).
43. 33 Ind. 215 (1870).
44. 9 Ind. 112 (1857).
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It would seem that these litigants were deprived of their standing in
Court under the Indiana Constitution simply because the statute had been
in existence for fifty years, thereby becoming unassailable on constitu-
tional grounds. Such a conclusion allowed the courts to evade their re-
sponsibility as decision makers and resulted in a mockery of the concept
of judicial review.
Since 1870 there have been no cases construing the general provi-
sions of the Indiana Sunday Closing Law, and so, ninety-one years later,
amid the confusion engendered by the diverse enforcement procedures
employed by the counties in this state,4" there are no cases considering
any possible conflict between the statute and the Federal or Indiana Con-
stitution. There has been dictum, however, in cases involving related
statutes dealing with specially proscribed Sunday activities. Therefore,
the judicial attitude of the courts of this state regarding the religious
overtones of the law may be analyzed.
In 1860 the Indiana Supreme Court indicated that if the purpose of
the Sunday Closing Law was the protection or enforcement of the Sab-
bath as an institute of the Christian religion it could not be sustained
under the Indiana Constitution.46 It was pointed out in a later case, 7
however, that Sunday Closing Laws were justified as an exercise of the
state's police power if their purpose was to provide for a periodic respite
from physical and mental toil. This would be so even though the Chris-
tian religion undoubtedly encouraged the enactment of these laws. In
1958 the Indiana Supreme Court, 8 addressing itself to the purpose of
Sunday Closing Laws, concluded that the Indiana statutes in this area
were completely divorced from any intent of fostering a particular re-
ligious belief, and were warranted because of the desire of the govern-
ment to set aside a recurring day of rest. This was considered desirable
in order to provide an atmosphere of free opportunity for recreation,
moral development and physical leisure. The designation by the legisla-
ture of Sunday as the day of rest for all, as opposed to a provision where-
by each individual would choose his day of rest, was sustained in order
that the day set aside would concur with the day observed by the greatest
number of other persons, thus permitting more extensive group recrea-
tional activities.
Any further attack on Indiana's Sunday Closing Law based on the
contention that it coerces adherence to the practices of the Christian ma-
45. See text supra at note 5.
46. Thomasson v. State, 15 Ind. 449 (1860). IND. CONST. art. I, § 4 was undoubted-
ly the provision referred to.
47. Carr v. State, 175 Ind. 241, 93 N.E. 1071 (1911).
48. Tinder v. Clark's Auto Co., 238 Ind. 302, 149 N.E.2d 808 (1958).
NOTES
jority under either the Federal or State Constitution would appear to be
fruitless because of the judicial construction of the statute as a justifiable
exercise of the state's police power. Although the United States Supreme
Court is not bound to accept the construction a state places on its laws
when faced with a federal question,49 the Court has demonstrated that it
is quite willing to accept this construction as a valid classification of Sun-
day Closing Laws."
The characterization of the purpose of Sunday Closing Laws as
merely providing a day of leisure for society ignores the realities of the
situation. To require abstention from non-religious activity on Sunday
is, at least to some degree, to influence church attendance. Even more
tenuous is the selection of the Christian Sabbath out of seven possible
days as the coerced day of leisure for the community." Moreover, those
jurisdictions which do not except from the law persons who have funda-
mental religious obligations on another day may force the shopkeeper
who worships on Saturday to remain open on that day in violation of
his religious beliefs because he cannot economically afford to close two
days a week. It would be more realistic to reject the argument that Sun-
day Closing Laws constitute an establishment of religion on the grounds
that this is not the type of state religious interference which the Everson
standards seek to prohibit, rather than that they have no religious impli-
cations. In other words, as the Court in People v. Freidnan9 2 stated:
It is not a law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . . It does not set up a
church, make attendance at religious worship compulsory, im-
pose restrictions upon expression of religious belief, work a re-
striction upon the exercise of religion according to the dictates
of one's conscience, provide compulsory support, by taxation or
otherwise, of religious institutions, nor in any way enforce or
prohibit religion."8
EXCEPTIONS TO THE APPLICATION OF THE INDIANA LAW
The Sabbatarian exception to the Sunday closing law-"but noth-
ing herein contained shall be construed to affect such as conscientiously
49. E.g., Memphis Steam Laundry v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952); Dyer v. Sims,
341 U.S. 22 (1951) ; Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363 (1929).
50. "We have uniformly recognized state laws relating to the observance of Sunday
as enacted in the legitimate exercise of the police power of the state." Petit v. Minne-
sota, 177 U.S. 164, 165 (1899).
51. But cf., Humphrey Chevrolet v. City of Evanston, 7 Ill. 2d 402, 131 N.E.2d 70
(1955), which suggests Sunday was picked because it was always the day on which most
people rested.
52. 302 N.Y. 75, 96 N.E.2d 184 (1950), appeal dismissed, 341 U.S. 907 (1951).
53. Id. at 80, 96 N.E.2d 184, 186 (1950).
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observe the seventh day of the week as the Sabbath" 4 has come before
the Indiana Supreme Court in a different context from that before the
United States Supreme Court in Brauifield v. Brown.5  In the latter
case the argument was rejected that the absence of such an exception in
Sunday Closing Laws violates the free exercise of religion clause of the
first amendment. In Johns v. State," the Indiana Court rejected the
claim that such an exception violated the privileges and immunities clause
of the Indiana Constitution by allowing only Sabbatarians to escape the
penalties of the law, and advantage not accorded to all classes of citizens.
The court reasoned that there was no special privilege accorded to any
class since, in the absence of such a proviso, Sabbatarians would be forced
to remain at rest two days of each week and all other persons only one
day. The legislature was commended for creating such an exception be-
cause it was considered to be harmonious with the concept of freedom in
all matters of religious belief as required by the Federal and State Con-
stitution.
Other state courts are not in accord as to the validity of the Sab-
batarian exception." Ohio agrees with Indiana that such an exemption
does not violate the privileges and immunities clause of that state's con-
stitution and even indicates that it would declare a statute without the ex-
ception invalid." Washington has also sustained the constitutionality of
the Sabbatarian exception against a similar attack, citing the Johns case
with approval."9 However, both Louisiana 0 and New Jersey"' have held
these exceptions to be discriminatory and invalid under the state privileges
and immunities clause because of the business advantage afforded Sab-
batarians on Sunday. This position is of questionable merit. In order
to give the argument any validity, the non-Sabbatarian should be required
to make a showing of fact that the consumer demand for retail goods is
higher on Sunday in proportion to the number of stores open than it is
on Saturday, the day of the week the Sabbatarian closes. This would
be a formidable task in nearly every instance, but in any event, there is
nothing in the reports suggesting that such a showing was made in the
above cases.
54. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4301 (Burns 1956).
55. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
56. 78 Ind. 332 (1881).
57. The Sabbatarian exception is quite common in Sunday legislation. Of the thirty-
four states which have general Sunday closing laws, twenty-one of them have a Sabba-
tarian exception, although only eight of the twenty-one provide complete immunity, while
the others prohibit sales activity but allow labor. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 553-59 (1961) (concurring opinion) (app.).
58. City of Cincinnati v. Rice, 15 Ohio 225 (1846).
59. State v. Grabinski, 33 Wash. 2d 603, 206 P.2d 1022 (1949).
60. City of Shreveport v. Levy, 26 La. 671 (1874).
61. Kislinger v. Treasurer of Plainfield, 10 N.J. Misc. 798, 160 At. 654 (1932).
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In view of the strong recommendation given the Sabbatarian excep-
tion by the Indiana Supreme Court and by the United States Supreme
Court dictum in the Braunfield case indicating that such an exception
would be a wise, although possibly impracticable, approach to Sunday
Closing Laws, any subsequent constitutional attack on the Indiana statute
on this ground would appear to be clearly unavailable.
The one aspect of the Sunday Closing Law which has engendered
the most controversy and confusion has been the exception for "works
of charity and necessity," 2 especially necessity. 3  Indiana is no excep-
tion. Reliance upon this provision in the Sunday Closing Law was a
natural development in this state since the statute was early held to be
constitutional 4 and to cover every form of secular activity not specific-
ally exempted."3 Therefore, the only contention available to one charged
with a violation of the Closing Law would be that his particular en-
deavors were within the exception.
The first Indiana case involving the necessity exception held, with-
out mentioning the Sunday Closing Law, that a jury may sit and return
a verdict on Sunday because of the inability of the jury to properly ob-
serve the Sabbath while locked in a jury room."0 Other Indiana cases
have endorsed this position as to various judicial functions, although bas-
ing their conclusions directly on the statute. 7
In 1866 the first judicial standard of what constituted a necessity
within the meaning of the Sunday Closing Law was evolved. In Pate v.
Vright'" a promisor escaped liability on a contract for refusing to de-
liver on Sunday a quantity of flour that had been shipped down the Ohio
River by steamboat. The promisee's argument that the activity was a
62. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4301 (Burns 1956).
63. As an example of the impossibility of predicting how a given case will be de-
cided in any jurisdiction the following comparison is illustrative: Ungeright v. State,
119 Ind. 379, 21 N.E. 1082 (1899) (Barbering not a necessity) ; Gray v. Commonwealth,
171 Ky. 269, 188 S.W. 354 (1916) (Barbering a necessity under certain conditions) ; Yon-
oski v. State, 79 Ind. 393 (1881) (Repairing a railroad a necessity) ; Philadelphia W&B
Ry. v. Lehman, 56 Md. 209 (1881) (Operating a railroad not a necessity); Turner v.
State, 67 Ind. 595 (1879) (Cutting ripe wheat a necessity) ; State v. Goff, 20 Ark. 289
(1859) (Cutting ripe wheat not a necessity); Wilkinson v. State, 59 Ind. 416 (1877)
(Hauling melons to market a necessity); Commonwealth v. White, 190 Mass. 578, 77
N.E. 636 (1906) (Hauling cranberries to market not a necessity) ; Williams v. Common-
wealth, 179 Va. 741, 20 S.E.2d 493 (1942) (Operation of a movie theatre a necessity) ;
City of Crawfordsville v. Jackson, 201 Ind. 619, 170 N.E. 850 (1930) (Operation of a
movie theatre not a necessity) ; Francisco v. Commonwealth, 180 Va. 376, 23 S.E.2d 234
(1942) (Selling beer a necessity); Thomasson v. State, 15 Ind. 449 (1860) (Selling
beer not a necessity).
64. See text supra at note 40.
65. See text supra at note 39.
66. Corey v. Silcox, 5 Ind. 370 (1854).
67. E.g., Jones v. Johnson, 61 Ind. 264 (1878) ; Kiger v. Coats, 18 Ind. 154 (1862);
Joy v. State, 14 Ind. 139 (1859).
68. 30 Ind. 476 (1868).
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work of necessity since it was probable that the Ohio River would be
dosed by ice in a very short time was to no avail. The Court considered
contingencies arising out of business dealings insufficient to escape the
prohibition of the statute. A filial duty, a supreme law of the land re-
quiring the act, the endangering of life or limb or a sense of moral f it-
ness surrounding the act were stated to be the only proper exceptions.
These early decisions were soon discarded in favor of a standard
sympathizing with the exigencies of the commercial world. The court
in Morris v. State" determined that the extraction of maple syrup can
properly be performed on Sunday as a necessity within the statute because
of the extremely short period of the year during which the activity can
be carried on, and its dependence on proper weather conditions. The case
accepted the formulation of the meaning of necessity in Flagg v. Inhabi-
tants of Millbury 0 that "by the word necessity in the exception we are not
to understand a physical and absolute necessity; but a moral fitness or
propriety of the work and labor done, under the circumstances of any
particular case.""
A large measure of uncertainty was injected into the necessity ex-
ception the following year by Crockett v. State."2 There, defendant's
conviction for turning a heap of barley on Sunday incident to the manu-
facture of beer was reversed because he proved that unless this was done
the barley would spoil. The court ignored the Flagg test, although its
application probably would have resulted in an acquittal, and indicated:
- Our statute exempts works of necessity, and as the evidence
proves the labor, with which the appellant is charged, to have
been a work necessary to accomplish the object in view, and as
the law authorizes the manufacture of beer, the purpose there-
fore being lawful, the labor was also lawful."
Such a pronouncement was the equivalent of no standard at all, since,
unless the end product of the labor was prohibited by law, any labor
necessary to its accomplishment was also lawful regardless of whether
it was done on Sunday. That test emasculated the Sunday Closing Law
because the test of a lawful purpose would be decided by a determination
of whether it was prohibited by some statute other than the Blue Law.
The Crockett "lawful-purpose" test was relied on in cases holding
69. 31 Ind. 189 (1869).
70. 4 Cush. 243 (1849).
71. Id. at 244. This quote is the most widely accepted definition of the word
"necessity" under the Sunday Closing Laws. See 50 Alf. Jur. Sundays and Holidays §
16 (1944).
72. 33 Ind. 416 (1870).
73. Id. at 417.
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that hauling melons to market," feeding hogs,"5 harvesting ripe wheat 0
and selling cigars to those who have acquired the habit" were necessities
within the meaning of the statute. The test was not used, however, in
holding that enforcement of the criminal laws on Sunday was a neces-
sity,"5 and it was ignored in deciding that operating a theatre on Sunday
violated the statute.9
The Crockett doctrine was shortlived and was overruled in Mueller
v. State, which held that the sale of tobacco on Sunday was not a neces-
sity."0 The court determined that necessity was a word incapable of pre-
cise definition, and the difficulty with cases accepting the reasoning of
Crockett was the attempt to frame a rigid definition of necessity as a mat-
ter of law, when in reality the meaning of the exception can be ascertained
only as a matter of fact based on the circumstances of each case. The
"lawful-purpose" test was considered defective because necessity is de-
cided from the legality of the purpose, whereas, under a correct inter-
pretation of the law, the purpose or end product of the labor can only be
lawful when there is a necessity for its accomplishment. In other words,
the emphasis in each case should be on what constitutes a work of neces-
sity within the terms of the statute, which in turn determines whether
the purpose of the activity was lawful, and not vice versa. The Flagg
rule was then re-adopted by the Court with the additional provision that
a person must not have been able to reasonably foresee that the necessity
would arise.
Subsequent to the Mueller case, it has been held not unlawful to keep
open a telegTaph office on Sunday since there might be an emergency."
Sending a telegraph message could not be considered a ncessity as a mat-
ter of law, 12 although if there was an emergency, it could be as a matter
of fact." Repairing railroad tracks on Sunday was a necessity because
of the benefit accruing to the public as a result of having trains run on
schedule."' Operating a barber shop was not a necessity because it did
not achieve a greater public benefit to the community than does the en-
74. Wilkinson v. State, 59 Ind. 416 (1877).
75. Edgerton v. State, 67 Ind. 588 (1879).
76. Turner v. State, 67 Ind. 595 (1879).
77. Carver v. State, 69 Ind. 61 (1879).
78. State v. Douglas, 69 Ind. 544 (1879).
79. McCarthy v. State, 56 Ind. 203 (1877). Accord, City of Crawfordsville v.
Jackson, 201 Ind. 619, 170 N.E. 850 (1930) ; Ross v. State, 9 Ind. App. 35, 36 N.E. 167
(1898).
80. 76 Ind. 310 (1881).
81. Rogers v. Western Union Telegraph, 78 Ind. 169 (1881).
82. Western Union Telegraph v. Fulling, 49 Ind. App. 172, 96 N.E. 967 (1911).
83. Western Union Telegraph v. Yopst, 118 Ind. 248, 20 N.E. 222 (1888).
84. Yonoski v. State, 79 Ind. 393 (1881).
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forced day of rest.8" Work incidental to assessing property for taxation
on Sunday was not a necessity because it did not substantially further any
matter of public interest, and it was just as expedient to do the work on
any other day of the week.8 Finally, operating an excursion boat on Sun-
day was not considered a necessity within the exception to the general
provision of the law."
From this summary of the principal Indiana cases on the necessity
and charity provisions, two generalizations may be made. First, the
definition of necessity stated in Flagg v. Inhabitants of Millbury88 is still
the accepted test in this state. Second, because of the broader concept
of what activities are within the purpose of the statute as promoting so-
ciety's day of rest and relaxation, it would seem reasonable to predict a
significant expansion of the meaning of the exception for necessities in
future cases.
The courts will face a difficult problem, i.e., the inability to formu-
late precise standards as to what fosters the purpose of a uniform day
of rest, because of the differing tastes of the American people. For ex-
ample, a storekeeper is charged with the sale of merchandise on Sunday.
It will be extremely difficult in many cases to say that what he sells will
not enhance both the buyer's and the public's rest and relaxation on that
day. Millions of Americans play golf on Sunday. A player probably
would not violate the Sunday Closing Law because he is not engaging in
his usual vocation or an act of common labor. It would also seem that
the club professional would escape prosecution, for even though he is
engaging in his usual vocation in selling merchandise at the course, his
presence and resultant activity is required to enable the players to par-
ticipate in the game. What about the downtown sporting goods proprie-
tor, however, who sells the same merclandise? May he remain open on
Sunday? If the golf course has available for sale golf clothes and golf
shoes, does this mean that clothing and shoe stores can also sell these
products on Sunday? If they can, must they limit sales to golf apparel,
or can any item in the store be sold? Many drug stores are engaged in
so-called department store merchandising, i.e., stocking items such as
clothing and hardware entirely unrelated to the drug business. If it is
necessary for a drug store to dispense medicinal items to sick people on
Sunday, must sales be limited solely to drugs, or may non-medicinal items
be sold? Thirty-one years ago operation of a movie theatre was held to
85. Ungeright v. State, 119 Ind. 379, 21 N.E. 1082 (1889).
86. Stellhorn v. Board of Comm'rs of Allen County, 60 Ind. App. 14, 110 N.E. 89
(1915).
87. Dugan v. State, 125 Ind. 130, 25 N.E. 171 (1890).
88. 4 Cush. 243 (1849).
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be a violation of the Sunday Closing Law. 9 Would this still be so?
What about movies shown on television on Sunday? Are they "neces-
sary" ? Is television itself an exception when the stations are not engaged
in the publication of news, which is specifically exempted by the statute?"
These are some problems the court must face in trying to administer
the Sunday statute at the present time. It does not require a vivid imagi-
nation to recognize the futility of the task and to understand the reasons
why he statute has remained dormant since 1930.
DEFENSES ON GROUNDS OTHER THAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Since the Sunday Closing Law has withstood the requirements of
the Indiana Constitution, and, as indicated above, will almost certaintly
withstand a first amendment attack in the courts, an exploration of pos-
sible defenses to a charge of violating the Sunday Closing Law is in order.
The most obvious defense is simply to argue that the necessity ex-
ception applies to the defendant's activity. This contention is broadened
by the characterization of the Sunday Closing Law by the courts as a
means of providing opportunities for the community's rest, relaxation
and physical leisure as a concomitant of an enforced day of rest. There-
fore, if the litigant can show a correlation between his conduct and the
promotion of such a purpose, he might escape the penalty of the law.
A second approach would utilize the purpose of the law as a basis
for attacking the Sunday Closing Law under the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The purpose of the statute in prohibiting
common labor and the exercise of one's usual vocation is to provide a
day of rest, relaxation and recreation for the community. It has been
established that this purpose does not require complete inactivity on that
day.0" The exception for works of necessity makes the Act inapplicable
to any endeavor that has as its objective the promotion of the recreational
atmosphere of the day. The interests of modern society are so diverse
and complex that it may be impossible to determine in advance whether
a sale of a particular commodity will or will not aid in the achievement
of the buyer's or community's recreational desires of the day. Therefore,
the exception in the law may be so vague that it violates due process be-
cause it fails to give reasonable notice of what conduct is forbidden.92
The Indiana Constitution has a plain-wording provision93 which has
89. City of Crawfordsville v. Jackson, 201 Ind. 619, 170 N.E. 850 (1930).
90. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4301 (Bums 1956).
91. Carr v. State, 175 Ind. 241, 93 N.E. 1071 (1911).
92. E.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) ; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S.
242 (1936); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1930).
93. ID. CONST. art. 4, § 20.
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been interpreted as requiring definiteness in' statutory language.9" Al-
though some recent Indiana9 and Federal9" cases have utilized this vague-
ness tool in invalidating statutes, it has been increasingly recognized that
"meticulous exactitude and absolute precision is rarely attained, nor is it
required in the drafting of statutes,""7 and that "a penal statute is suf-
ficiently certain, although it may use general terms, if the offense is so
defined as to convey to a person of ordinary intelligence an adequate
description of the evil to be prohibited." 8
The word "necessity" is somewhat imprecise, but, since not all com-
binations of words can be said to lay down a rule which is the very es-
sence of the law, most statutory language lacks precision in this respect.9
Therefore, it may be predicted that both the Indiana Supreme Court and
the United States Supreme Court would find "necessity" similar to the
word "reasonable"19" in that it is incapable of any greater exactitude
under the circumstnaces of the Sunday Closing Law, and like the Mary-
land statute in the McGowan case, it is such that reasonable men of ordi-
nary intelligence should be able to ascertain what the exception en-
compasses.
Notwithstanding the frailty of a due-process argument based upon
the vagueness of the word "necessity," the primary ground on which a
court should reject the defense is that the defendant has misconceived the
proper objection to the application of the statute to him. The short-
coming of the statute is not because it is vague, but because it's conducive
only to sporadic enforcement.
The antiquity of Sunday legislation that tends to cause it to be re-
garded as part of- our American way of life is also responsible for much
of the hostility toward these laws. Simply as a matter of draftsmanship,
many of the statutes are outdated and have little meaning. A good ex-
ample of this is the exception for ferrymen and toll bridge keepers in the
Indiana statute.' These references to bygone eras only add to the al-
94. See Jennings v. State, 16 Ind. 335 (1861); McJunkins v. State, 10 Ind. 140
(1858) ; Hackney v. State, 8 Ind. 494 (1856).
95. E.g., Railroad Comm'r v. Grand Trunk Western Ry., 179 Ind. 225, 100 N.E. 758
(1912); Cook v. State, 26 Ind App. 278, 59 N.E. 489 (1900).
96. See cases cited note 93 supra.
97. Illinois Steel Co. v. Fuller, 216 Ind. 180, 185, 23 N.E.2d 259, 262 (1939).
98. Smith v. State, 186 Ind. 252, 256, 115 N.E. 943, 945 (1916) ; accord, Connally
v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1925); Molinger v. Metropolitan Planning
Comm'n, 236 Ind. 298, 140 N.E.2d 220 (1956).
99. [T~he law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating
rightly, that this, as the jury subsequently estimates it . N.' ash v. U.S., 229 U.S. 373,
374 (1913).
100. Gallagher v. State, 193 Ind. 629, 141 N.E. 347 (1923) ; accord, Smith v. State,
186 Ind. 252, 115 N.E. 943 (1916).
101. IN . ANN. STAT. § 10-4301 (Burns 1956).
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ready lax enforcement of the Sunday Closing Law." 2 Statutes of other
states have terminology which renders enforcement completely impossible.
Tennessee, for example, has a blanket prohibition against all work.' Is
this to be enforced against policemen, firemen and doctors? The answer
is obvious, and the result is that the statute is enforced against no one.
Thus, the Sunday Closing Laws often remain unenforced until some pri-
vate group promotes enforcement of the statute against certain individual
or group interests which it opposes. As a result of this pressure, the law
becomes a weapon in an economic struggle, a use scarcely conceived of
by the originators of this legislation. Moreover, persons who might come
under the statute's ban have no way of knowing when enforcement may
be commenced by the state as a result of such group agitation. Such in-
consistent enforcement cannot help but create an attitude of disrespect by
the public for the authority of law.
The Sunday Closing Law does not acquire a more definite meaning
by lying dormant for long periods of time. It seems clear, however, that
the objections of a person convicted under a law that has been virtually
extinct for thirty-one years are not based primarily on the vagueness of
the statute but on its sudden enforcement against him.
A final possible attack on the Sunday Closing Law would involve
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment or, alterna-
tively, the privileges and immunities clause of the Indiana Constitution.
The argument is not the normal equal protection contention that the legis-
lation is arbitrary or discriminatory on its face,10 4 but rather that the non-
discriminatory law has been discriminatorily applied by the local law en-
forcement officials.' The defendant would maintain that, within his
community, other businesses, either exactly like his or engaged in an ac-
tivity implicitly within the provisions of the law, have been allowed to
remain open on Sunday while he has been required to close. For ex-
ample, the owner of a grocery store might prove systematic enforcement
of the Sunday Closing Law against him while some or all other grocery
stores in the same local were allowed to operate on Sunday.
The proposition that discriminatory enforcement of a. law non-
discriminatory on its face violates the Fourteenth Amendment was, estab-
lished in Fick Wo v. Hopkins.'"0 The Court remarked:
102. Some courts have recognized this lack of enforcement. See Hertz Washo-
mobile Sys. v. South Orange, 41 N.J. Super. 110, 124 A.2d 68 (1957) ; State v. McGee,
237 N.C. 633, 75 S.E.2d 783 (1953).
103. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4001 (1955).
104. Cf., Tussman and ten Brock, Equal-Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv.
341 (1949).
105. See Note, 59 YALE L.J. 354 (1950).
106. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public
authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically
to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in
similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of
equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution."0 7
Even though the purpose of the equal-protection clause is to protect
persons from discrimination from all public officials, 108 it is submitted
that an attack on the Sunday Closing Law because of discriminatory en-
forcement would, in almost every case, be unavailing because of the dif-
ficult burden of proof imposed on the defendants.' What sometimes
seems to be discriminatory enforcement is actually selectivity in prosecu-
tion required by necessity stemming from shortages of men, money and
equipment, or by the physical impossibility of apprehending all offenders.
Also, the scope of defendant's showing of fact would be limited to estab-
lishments exactly like his which have been allowed to remain open. Argu-
ing that it is discriminatory to close drug stores and not grocery stores
would be fallacious because of the possibility that the latter operations,
or any other related businesses with which an analogy is sought to be
drawn, would fall within the expanded concept of the necessity exception
of the Sunday Closing Law as mentioned above.
Another important factor limiting the utility of a defense based on
equal protection is that most courts have held that failure to enforce the
law impartially is no defense to prosecution for an illegal act."' Com-
bined with this barrier is an important analytical difference which would
prevent the application of the Yick Wo reasoning. In that case the ad-
ministrator was found to have systematically abused a discretionary duty
in determining what activity was unlawful. On the other hand, in the
case of the Sunday Closing Law the police would be performing a non-
discretionary duty of enforcing a law which prohibits conduct defined
by the legislature."' A Kentucky court" 2 summarized the distinciton
when faced with the proposition that the state's Closing Law was being
107. Id. at 373-74.
108. Chicago B&Q Ry. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
109. Defendant's claim of discriminatory enforcement of the Sunday Closing Law
was rejected for lack of a sufficient offer of proof in both State v. Trantman, 230 N.C.
641, 55 S.E.2d 198 (1949) and People v. Friedman, 302 N.Y. 75, 96 N.E.2d 184 (1950);
appeal dismissed, 341 U.S. 907 (1951).
110. E.g., Buxbom v. City of Riverside, 29 F. Supp. 3 (S.D. Cal. 1939) ; Creash v.
State, 131 Fla. 111, 179 So. 149 (1938) ; Patterson v. State, 18 Ala. App. 55, 88 So. 360
(1921).
111. See Society of Good Neighbors v. Van Antwerp, 324 Mich. 624, 36 N.E.2d
308 (1949).
112. Strand Amusement Co. v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky4 48, 43 S.W.2d 321 (1931).
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enforced only against the defendant motion-picture theatre owner -by
stating:
The Yick Wo principle, however, is not applicable here, for
no discretion is authorized in the administration or application
of the statute. It is a fundamental principle that the failure of
executive officers to enforce a specific law against a specific
individual or set of individuals can never excuse the disobedi-
ence of that law by another."'
CONCLUSION
The Indiana Sunday Closing Law due to its antiquity is firmly en-
trenched in the law of this state. This same antiquity, however, often
prohibits the statute from coping with the complexities of modem society.
In addition, the classification of the purpose of the law as the promotion
of society's health and welfare would seem to impose upon the court an
insolvable problem. It is doubtful that a rational standard can be evolved
whereby it can be accurately determined what acts are in furtherance of
the purpose of the law.
If the purpose of the statute is other than the establishment of a re-
ligion it does not contravene the first amendment. Even so its probable
effect, by freeing all non-Sabbatarians from work on Sunday, is to pro-
mote the Christian faith. Thus, regardless of how the purpose of the
statute is classified, its religious overtones remain.
The wisdom of sudden and sporadic enforcement of the statute,
which has lain almost completely dormant since its inception, is question-
able. In reliance on this long policy of non-enforcement much of the
commercial world has geared itself for Sunday business. To suddenly
deprive it of this opportunity appears to be extremely inequitable. This
is particularly so when it is recognized that the sudden enforcement is
partially attributable to the efforts of pressure groups representing such
organizations as retail merchants and automobile dealers aimed at con-
trolling competition. Such circumstances are hardly compatible with the
characterization of the statute as a vehicle with which the state seeks to
promote the public health and welfare.
These factors tend to bring the law into disrepute in the eyes of the
public. Under such circumstances it is doubtful whether the law is either
effective or desirable. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma"4 stated the
case against the Sunday Closing Laws thus: "They should be either
113. Id. at 50, 43 S.W.2d 321, 323 (1931).
114. Cheeves v. State, 5 Okla. 361, 114 Pac. 1125 (1911).
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amended or repealed. Nre do not like to speak disrespectfully of any
legislative act, but our present laws upon the subject of Sabbath breaking
are a miserable farce."'15
115. Id. at 363, 114 Pac. 1125, 1126 (1911).
